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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
NEW YORK CITY CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW OF 1969
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been growing concern over the lack of
legal protection afforded the American consumer. Comprehensive
consumer protection legislation has been introduced at all levels
of government,1 and several significant proposals have been
enacted into law. 2 One such enactment at the municipal level is
the New York City Consumer Protection Law of 1969,3 which
1 A sampling of consumer protection measures introduced in recent months is set forth
in BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 3 1, 1970, at 51.2 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS § 205A- I to -22 (Supp. 1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93A, §§ I - 10 (Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 to -12 (1964), as amended,
§ 56:8- 12 to - 14 (Supp. 1970).
3 NEW YORK, N.Y., AD. CODE ch. 64, § 2203d- 1.0 to -8.9 (hereinafter referred to as
Consumer Protection Law of 1969). Passed by the New York City Council on December
11, 1969, and approved by the Mayor on December 29, 1969, the substantive provisions
ordinance reads as follows:
§ 2203d- 1.0 Unfair trade practices prohibited.-No person shall engage in
any deceptive or unconscionable trade practice in the sale, lease, rental or
loan or in the offering for sale, lease, rental, or loan of any consumer goods or
services, or in the collection of consumer debts.
§ 2203d-2.0 Definitions.-a. Deceptive trade practice. Any false, falsely
disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement, visual description or
other representation of any kind made in connection with the sale, lease,
rental, or loan or in connection with the offering for sale, lease, rental, or loan
of consumer goods or services, or in the extension of consumer credit or in
the collection of consumer debts, which has the capacity, tendency or effect
of deceiving or misleading consumers. Deceptive trade practices include but
are not limited to: (I) representations that goods or services have sponsor-
ship, approval, accessories, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or
quantities that they do not have; the supplier has a sponsorship, approval,
status, affiliation, or connection that he does not have; goods are original or
new if they are deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, or sec-
ond-hand; or, goods or services are of particular standard, quality, grade,
style or model, if they are of another; (2) the use, in any oral or written
representation, of exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact
or failure to state a material fact if such use deceives or tends to deceive; (3)
disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading
representations of material facts; (4) offering goods or services with intent
not to sell them as offered; (5) offering goods or services with intent not to
supply reasonable expectable public demand, unless the offer discloses to
limitation of quantity; (6) making false or misleading representations of fact
concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions or
price comparison to prices of competitors or one's own price at a past or
future time; (7) stating that a consumer transaction involves consumer rights,
remedies or obligations that it does not involve; (8) stating that services,
replacements or repairs are needed if they are not; and (9) falsely stating the
reasons for offering or supplying goods or services at sale discount prices.
b. Unconscionable trade practice. Any act or practice in connection with
the sale, lease, rental, or loan or in connection with the offering for sale,
lease, rental, or loan of any consumer goods or services, or in the extension
of consumer credit, or in the collection on consumer debts which unfairly
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takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience or capacity of a
consumer; or results in a gross disparity between the value received by a
consumer and the price paid, to the consumer's detriment; provided that no
act or practice shall be deemed unconscionable under this title unless de-
clared unconscionable and described with reasonable particularity in a local
law, or in a rule or regulation promulgated by the commissioner. In promul-
gating such rules and regulations the commissioner shall consider among
other factors: (I) knowledge by merchants engaging in the act or practice of
the inability of consumers to receive properly anticipated benefits from the
goods or services involved; (2) gross disparity between the price of goods or
services and their value measured by the price at which similar goods or
services are readily obtained by other consumers; (3) the fact that the acts or
practices may enable merchants to take advantage of the inability of con-
sumers reasonably to protect their interests by reason of physical or mental
infirmities, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the agreement,
ignorance or lack of education, or similar factors; (4) the degree to which
terms of the transaction require consumers to waive legal rights; (5) the
degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to jeopardize
money or property beyond the money or property immediately at issue in the
transaction; and (6) definitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations,
rulings and decisions of legislative or judicial bodies in this state or else-
where.
c. Consumer goods, services, credit and debts. As used in §§ 2203d- 1.0,
2203- 2.0(a) and 2203d- 2.0(b) of this title, goods, services, credit and debts
which are primarily for personal, household or family purposes.
d. Consumer. A purchaser or lessee or prospective purchaser or lessee of
the consumer goods or services or consumer credit, including a co-obligor or
surety.
e. Merchant. A seller, lessor, creditor or any other person who makes
available either directly or indirectly, goods, services or credit, to consumers.
"Merchant" shall include manufacturers, wholesalers and others who are
responsible for any act or practice prohibited by this title.
f. Commissioner. Shall mean the commissioner of consumer affairs.
§ 2203d-3.0 Regulations.-The commissioner may adopt such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this title,
including regulations defining specific deceptive or unconscionable trade
practices.
Such rules and regulations may supplement but shall not be inconsistent
with the rules, regulations and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission
and the Federal courts in interpreting the provisions of Section 5 (a) (1), of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45 (a) (1), or the decisions of
the courts interpreting General Business Law §350 and Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 2-302.
§ 2203d-4.0 Enforcement.-a. The violation of any provision of this title
or of any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, shall be punishable upon
proof thereof, by the payment of a civil penalty in the sum of fifty dollars to
three hundred and fifty dollars, to be recovered in a civil action.
b. The knowing violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or
regulation promulgated thereunder, shall be punishable upon conviction
thereof, by the payment of a civil penalty in the sum of five hundred dollars,
or as a violation for which a fine in the sum of five hundred dollars shall be
imposed, or both.
c. Upon a finding by the commissioner of repeated, multiple or per-
sistent violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder, the city may except as hereinafter provided, bring
an action to compel the defendant or defendants in such action to pay in
court all monies, property'or other things, or proceeds thereof, received as
a result of such violations; to direct that the amount of money or the
property or other things recovered be paid into an account established
pursuant to section two thousand six hundred one of the civil practice law
and rules from which shall be paid over to any and all persons who
purchased the goods or services during the period of violation such sum as
was paid by them in a transaction involving the prohibited acts or practices,
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plus any costs incurred by such claimants in making and pursuing their
complaints; provided that if such claims exceed the sum recovered into the
account, the awards to consumers shall be prorated according to the value
of each claim proved; to direct the defendant or defendants, upon con-
viction, pay to the city the costs and disbursements of the action and pay to
the city for the use of the commissioner the costs of his investigation leading
to the judgment; or if not recovered from defendants, such costs are to be
deducted by the city from the grand recovery before distribution to the
consumers; and to direct that any money, property, or other things in the
account and unclaimed by any persons with such claims within one year
from creation of the account, be paid to the city, to be used by the commis-
sioner for further consumer law enforcement activities. Consumers making
claims against an account established pursuant to this subsection shall prove
their claims to the commissioner in a manner and subject to procedures
established by the commissioner for that purpose. The procedures estab-
lished in each case for proving claims shall not be employed until approved
by the court, which shall also establish by order the minimum means by
which the commissioner shall notify potential claimants of the creation of
the account. Restitution pursuant to a judgment in an action under this
subdivision shall bar, pro tanto, the recovery of any damages in any other
action against the same defendant or defendants on account of the same
acts or practices which were the basis for such judgment, up to the time of
the judgment, by any person to whom such restitution is made. Restitution
under this subsection shall not apply to transactions entered into more than
five years prior to commencement of an action by the commissioner. Before
instituting an action under this subsection, the commissioner shall give the
prospective defendant written notice of the possible action, and an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate in writing within five days, that no repeated, multiple,
or persistent violations have occurred.
d. Whenever any person has engaged in any acts or practices which
constitute violations of any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder, the city may make application to the supreme
court for an order enjoining such acts or practices and for an order
granting a temporary or permanent injunction, restraining order, or other
order enjoining such acts or practices.
e. To establish a cause of action under this section it need not be shown
that consumers are being or were actually injured.
§ 2203d-5.0 Settlements.-a. In lieu of instituting or continuing an action
pursuant to this title, the commissioner may accept written assurance of
discontinuance of any act or practice in violation of this title from the person
or persons who have engaged in such acts or practices. Such assurance may
include a stipulation for voluntary payment by the violator of the costs of
investigation by the commissioner and may also include a stipulation for the
restitution by the violator to consumers, of money, property or other things
received from them in connection with a violation of this title, including
money necessarily expended in the course of making and pursuing a com-
plaint to the commissioner. All settlements shall be made a matter of public
record.
If such stipulation applies to consumers who have been affected by the
violator's practices but have not yet complained to the commissioner, the
assurance must be approved by the court, which shall direct the minimum
means by which potential claimants shall be notified of the stipulation. A
consumer need not accept restitution pursuant to such stipulation; his accep-
tance shall bar recovery of any other damages in any action by him against
the defendant or defendants on account of the same acts or practices.
b. Violation of an assurance entered into pursuant to this section shall be
treated as a violation of this title, and shall be subject to all the penalties
provided therefor.
§ 2203d-6.0 Persons excluded from this title.-Nothing in this title shall
apply to any television or radio broadcasting station or to any publisher or
printer of a newspaper, magazine, or other form of printed advertising, who
broadcasts, publishes, or prints such advertisement, except insofar as said
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establishes a framework for a broad ban against unfair trade
practices and vests the city's Commissioner of Consumer Affairs
with extensive powers of enforcement. In this note, the New
York City ordinance will be analyzed and evaluated against the
general background of existing consumer protection legislation in
the United States.
II. BACKGROUND
Numerous enactments are to be found at the federal, state and
municipal level which may be loosely categorized as consumer
protection laws. Such laws are typically narrow in scope and
seldom provide for centralized administration and enforcement. 4
Furthermore, many governmental entities which have established
protective measures have done so in a piecemeal manner and
have failed to integrate these measures into a single, com-
prehensive statutory provision. 5
One of the serious inadequacies of much of existing legislation
is that the only remedies established are public in nature and do
not provide a means by which individual consumers who have
been injured by unfair trade practices may obtain compensatory
relief.6 Typical laws create public remedies in the form of civil
and criminal penalties, and injunctive relief 7 which at best will
deter or prevent only future unfair trade practices. The proceeds
arising from court imposed penalties are paid to the government
and are not available to individual consumers injured by the unfair
trade practice which was the basis for the penalty.
Furthermore, most laws do nothing to remove the obstacles
which hinder utilization of the traditional compensatory private
remedies.8 For example, although an individual consumer who
has been victimized in the marketplace may institute an action for
station or publisher or printer is guilty of deception in the sale of offering for
sale of its own services. This title shall not apply to advertising agencies,
provided they are acting on information provided by their clients.
4 See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Quality of Consumer Transac-
tion Problems, 48 .B.U.L. Rev. 559, 596 (1968); Comment, Consumer Protection in
Michigan: Current Methods and Some Proposals for Reform, 68 MICH. L. REV. 926, 927
(1970).5 See Rice, supra note 4, at 596-97; Consumer Protection in Michigan: Current
Methods and Some Proposals for Reform, supra note 4, at 927.
6 Rice, supra note 4, at 583-95, discusses the nature of existing consumer protection
remedies and "new horizons" for establishing, within the scope of these remedies, a means
to provide injured consumers with compensatory relief.7 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS § 205 A- 13,-14 (Supp. 1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93A, § 4 (Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-8 (1964), § 56:8-3.1,- 13 (Supp. 1970).
S Rice, supra note 4, at 567-83, discusses the nature of private remedies for consumers
injured by unfair trade practices. See generally Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and
Form Contracts-Does the Consumer Have a Private Remedy?, 1968 DUKE L.J. 83 1.
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restitution or damages, the cost of such litigation normally renders
it impractical. 9 Aggrieved consumers could theoretically reduce
the individual cost of litigation by seeking recovery in a single
class action; however, it has proven extremely difficult to get such
an action into the courts. 10
At the federal level several obstacles confront the consumer
class action. Although Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure arguably provides a basis for this type of action, the
jurisdictional requirements of the federal judiciary seem to present
a formidable obstacle. Generally, there must be either a federal
question involved in the dispute 1 or complete diversity of citizen-
ship between the adverse parties.1 2 Since most such actions would
be likely to stem from state law, there is rarely federal question
jurisdiction. Likewise, the requisite complete diversity of citizen-
ship is often difficult to obtain. Moreover, any action which does
satisfy the federal question or diversity provision must meet the
additional jurisdictional requirement that the amount in con-
troversy exceed ten thousand dollars.1 3 In view of the recent
Supreme Court decision1 4 that plaintiffs having separate and dis-
tinct claims against a common defendant cannot aggregate their
claims in an effort to attain the ten thousand dollar minimum, the
possibility of bringing consumer class actions in the federal courts
has been drastically diminished.
At the state level, courts have traditionally interpreted rules of
civil procedure authorizing class actions in such a manner as to
exclude the bulk of consumer class actions.1 5 It is significant to
9 See Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 663, (1970), for a
concise discussion of the economic realities facing the consumer who wishes to sue on his
own behalf.
10 See generally Eckhardt, supra note 9, at 664-68; Travers & Landers, The Consumer
Class Action, 18 KAN. L. REV. 811, 816-19 (1970), for detailed discussion of the
problems encountered in bringing a consumer class action in the federal as well as state
courts.
1128 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
'
2 1d. § 1332.
13 Id. §§ 1331, 1332. Note, however, that a number of specific statutes confer jurisdic-
tion, without regard to the amount in controversy, in almost all areas that would-otherwise
fall under the federal question statute. C WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 108 (2d ed.
1970). For our discussion this is of little import since federal jurisdiction in consumer
actions is sought a most exclusively on diversity of citizenship grounds.
14 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). In Snyder, the Court dealt with two cases and
in each held that the claims were separate and distinct and could not be aggregated. The
first was a corporate shareholder action against members of the company's board of
directors seeking proper distribution to all shareholders of the proceeds from the sale of
certain securities. The second was a consumer action against a gas utilities company
seeking the refund of amounts allegedly improperly billed and collected.
15 For a discussion of the various types of state class action rules and the manner in
which they have been applied to consumer class actions, see Travers & Landers, supra
note 10, at 817- 19.
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note that while recent decisions in several states evidence what
may be a trend away from this traditional position, 16 equally
recent decisions in other states are clearly contra. For example, in
early 1970, the New York Court of Appeals had the opportunity
to reexamine its long line of decisions 17 giving a narrow in-
terpretation to that state's class action rule' 8 as applied to con-
sumer litigation. In Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America,19 the New
York court refused to alter its previous position and held that
suits brought against a finance company to recover a statutory
penalty imposed for the use of extremely small print in sales
contracts could not be maintained as a class action. Even though
the contracts had been prepared by the company and were as-
signed to the company immediately following each sale, the court
determined that the question was not one of common or general
interest and therefore could not be the basis for a class action.
Thus, while the status of the consumer class action is uncertain in
most states, the status of such action in the State of New York
has been made abundantly clear.
The increasing awareness of the lack of effective legislative
protection for the consumer has prompted a number of proposals
for change. 20 In several states, legislation has recently been
16 See, e.g., Darr v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967), in which the California Supreme Court held an action by a taxicab customer, in his
own behalf and for all others similarly situated, against a taxicab company to recover
excessive charges made by the company over a four-year period could properly be brought
as a class action; Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 2 CCH POVERTY L. REP. 9652
(I1l. Cir. Ct. Cook Co. 1969), in which an Illinois court held that an action by a charge
account customer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeking relief
from the defendant company's practice of making certain insurance changes without prior
authorization of the charge account customer could be maintained as a class action.
17 See, e.g., Society Milton Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22
N.E.2d 374, 3 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1939); and Onofrio v. Playboy Club of New York, Inc., 15
N.Y.2d 740, 205 N.E.2d 308, 257 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1965). In Society Milton Athena, the
court held that an action brought by depositors against defendant banks for fraud allegedly
committed through a joint office could not be maintained as a class action even though the
causes of action arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and involved
common questions of law and fact. In Onofrio, five out of an estimated fifty thousand
contributors of twenty-five dollars each to finance a private club commenced a class action
to impress a constructive trust and to obtain damages for breach of contract. The N.Y.
Court of Appeals held that a representative action could not be maintained for contract
damages and reinstated the lower appellate court dissenting opinion [20 App. Div. 3, 7,
244 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489 (1963)] which stated that "common wrongs do not necessarily
confer common rights or authorize a single common action."
18 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 1005(a) (McKinney 1963). Where the question is one of a
common or general interest of many persons or where the persons who might be made
parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
19 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
20 E.g., model consumer protection acts for states have been prepared by the Federal
Trade Commission [FTC, UNIFORM TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
LAW, reprinted in FTC, REPORT ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONSUMER PROTECTION
PROGRAM 3 (1969)], the Council of State Governments [COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (1970 Draft)],
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enacted providing for stronger prohibitions against an ever grow-
ing number of allegedly unfair trade practices. 21 Moving in the
direction of comprehensive consumer protection laws, these
states seek to narrow the gaps which existed when protection was
provided by means of numerous unrelated statutes, each narrow
in scope. Moreover, state commissions are being created to fur-
ther coordinate consumer protection efforts, and to provide for
centralized administration of consumer law. 22 The increased
awareness of consumer affairs has prompted some legislatures to
vest state attorneys general with unprecedented powers of en-
forcement including authorization to solicit assurances from mer-
chants who have violated the laws that they will desist from future
illegal acts,23 and, in at least one state, to negotiate monetary
settlement agreements, the proceeds of which are to be distributed
to injured consumers. 24 The authorization for the solicitation of
these assurances and settlements is particularly significant in that
it allows the attorney general, by moral suasion or otherwise, to
utilize a means of enforcement other than through formal proceed-
ings.
A few states have enacted legislation empowering the attorney
general to commence mass restitution actions on behalf of injured
consumers; 25 a single action may be brought by the state to obtain
compensatory relief for a large number of consumers who have
been injured by an unfair trade practice. This type of public
remedy, if used, is particularly important in states like New York,
where class actions brought by consumers to obtain com-
pensatory relief in the form of restitution have been barred from
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW, UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES
PRACTICE ACT (Third Draft) ]. For an analysis of the provisions of these acts in relation to
consumer protection in the State of Michigan, see Consumer Protection in Michigan:
Current Methods and Some Proposals for Reform, supra note 4, at 971- 84. Other model
acts have been prepared by the Harvard Journal of Legislation [An Act to Prohibit Unfair
and Deceptive Trade Practices, 7 HARV. J. LEGIS. 122 (1969)] and the National Con-
sumer Law Center [OFFICE OF LEGAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY,
NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT, A MODEL ACT FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION (1970)].
21 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS § 205A- I to -22 (Supp. 1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93A, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 to -12 (1964), as amended,
§ 56:8- 12 to - 14 (Supp. 1970). Each of these statutes establishes a ban against a broad
range of unfair trade practices.22 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 550-53 (McKinney Supp. 1970), establishing a state
consumer protection board and authorizing the appointment of an executive director
thereof. The board is empowered, among other things, to coordinate the activities of all
state agencies performing consumer protection functions.
2 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 65 (Supp. 1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 445.809 (Supp. 1970).
24 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 5 (Supp. 1970).
2 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 267 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 407.100 (Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-8 (1964); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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the courts. Although the legislation authorizing actions of this
type is still quite new, a possibly significant shortcoming is the
failure to provide means of promoting utilization of the power. If
the decision of the attorney general to institute these actions is not
guided by definite standards, and therefore not amenable to objec-
tive appraisal, it is quite possible that the legislation would do
relatively little to provide a meaningful public remedy for the
consumer victimized by unfair trade practices.
At the federal level, several proposals have been made for
better administration and increased enforcement of existing con-
sumer protection statutes. A comprehensive reorganization of the
Federal Trade Commission with increased emphasis on safe-
guarding the individual consumer has been recommended by both
the past and present chairmen of the Commission. 26 In December
of 1969, a bill was introduced in the Senate which proposed such
a change in the scope of FTC activity.2 7 A measure introduced in
early 1970 would significantly increase the aggrieved consumer's
access to the courts by allowing a private individual or class of
individuals to institute an action and recover damages incurred as
a result of a violation of existing federal law prohibiting unfair and
anti-competitive trade practices.28 Yet another bill would grant
the federal district courts jurisdiction over class actions brought
by one or more consumers on behalf of all consumers similarly
situated regardless of the amount in controversy or the citizenship
of the parties, thereby effectively eliminating the jurisdictional
obstacles facing consumer class actions in the federal courts. 29
Moreover, it would provide for the payment of attorney's fees if a
class of consumers prevails in such action.
Despite growing support for increased consumer protec-
tion- as evidenced by the amount of proposed and newly enacted
legislation at all levels of government-opposition to change is
widespread and manifests itself in many forms. For example,
members of the judiciary have expressed fear that increased con-
sumer remedies will overburden the courts with consumer litiga-
tion,30 and merchants argue that Better Business Bureaus, formed
2 6 See N.Y. Times, June 9, 1970, at 1, col. 2, for a report of the announcement by C. W.
Weinberger, then chairman of the FTC, of the internal reorganization of the FTC and the
need for further changes in the Commission. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1970, at 1,
col. 5, for a report of the appointment of Miles K. Kirkpatrick as new chairman of the
FTC and discussion of the recommendations of an American Bar Association study
committee on the FTC headed by Kirkpatrick prior to his appointment.
27 S. 3201, 91st Cong., ist Sess. (1969).
2 8 S. 3338, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
29 S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
30 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 1, col. 5, which reports Mr. Chief Justice
Burger's criticisms of proposed federal legislation authorizing consumer class actions in
the federal courts; and N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, at 39, col. 1, which reports similar
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and funded by local merchants themselves, are sufficient to police
the marketplace. 3 1 In view of this opposition, the possibilities of
enacting substantial reforms at present are rather limited. Con-
sequently, the consumer is left with little more than his own
wariness as a weapon against unfair and deceptive trade practices.
This, then, is the general background against which the New
York City ordinance was enacted and against which it must be
analyzed and evaluated.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK CITY LAW
A. Administration
Responsibility for the administration of the provisions of the
New York City Consumer Protection Law of 1969 has been
placed in the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs,3 2 who is further
empowered to coordinate the consumer protection activities of all
other city agencies.33 Serving the commissioner in an advisory
capacity is the city's Consumer Council. Consisting of twelve
members who are to represent a cross section of consumer in-
terests, the council is appointed by the Mayor.3 4 It is important to
note that the council has no administrative responsibilities. By
vesting all such responsibilities in the commissioner alone, the
city has avoided the problems inherent in "administration by
committee" and has thus expedited administration of consumer
protection.
The manner in which the city has provided for administration
of consumer protection is far superior to the establishment of
several uncoordinated agencies whose functions are limited to
specific areas of concern. It is generally agreed that such diver-
sified administration often results in duplication of effort, dilution
of resources and lack of uniform enforcement.3 5
B. Prohibitory Provisions
The provisions of the New York City Consumer Protection
Law of 1969, aside from those dealing with administration, can be
grouped into three categories: prohibitions, regulations, and en-
criticisms by members of the judiciary in attendance at a conference on court problems
held in the State of New York.
31 N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
32 In general, the ordinance vests the commissioner with responsibility for issuing rules
and regulations setting forth particular trade practices prohibited, Consumer Protection
Law of 1969, §§ 2203d-2.0(b), 2203d-3.0, and for coordinating enforcement of the pro-
hibitory provisions, id. §§ 2203d-4.0(c), 2203d-5.0(a).
33 NEW YORK, N.Y., AD. CODE, ch. 64, § 2203a.
34 Id. § 2204.
35 See Rice, supra note 4, at 595-604, for a general discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of integrated administration of consumer protection legislation.
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forcement. First, the ordinance sets forth a general statement as
to the nature of unfair trade practices prohibited:
No person shall engage in any deceptive or unconscionable
trade practice in the sale, lease, rental, or loan of any con-
sumer goods or services, or in the collection of consumer
debts. (Emphasis added). 36
Trade practices relating to consumer services as well as those
relating to consumer goods fall within the scope of the ordinance.
1. Deceptive Trade Practices-The ordinance's definition of
"deceptive" practices includes representations of any kind which
have the "capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading
consumers" (emphasis added).3 7 This provision is extremely
broad-it does not focus on the merchant's intent, nor does it
stipulate that a consumer must actually be deceived or misled.3 8
If a trade practice has the capacity or tendency to deceive or
mislead, then it is prohibited regardless of whether a buyer was, in
fact, deceived. Conversely, if a practice does in fact deceive or
mislead a consumer (ignorant though he may be), then it is prohib-
ited whether or not it is generally considered to have the capacity
or tendency to do so.
Moreover, the language of the provision seems to clearly pro-
hibit ordinary puffing and exaggeration3 9 which traditionally have
been permissible under the law of the State of New York.40
Although such statements may at times be understood as nothing
more than a merchant's opinion or commendation of his prod-
uct-incapable of creating a warranty-they certainly have the
capacity, if not the tendency and effect, to deceive or mislead
consumers. This complete prohibition, although radically different
from the common law dogma of nearly every jurisdiction, does
not appear to be logically untenable. Exaggeration, regardless of
how minor, is by definition contrary to fact. The effect of this
ordinance is simply to require a person who gains by the sale of a
product to assume the risk of any inaccuracies in the representa-
tion he makes in its behalf. Indeed the basic premise of the
36 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d- 1.0.37 Id. § 2203d-2.0(a).
38 Id. § 2203d-4.0(e), specifically provides that to establish a cause of action under the
ordinance it need not be shown that consumers are being or were actually injured.
39 Id. § 2203d-2.0(a)(2).
40 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-313(2) (McKinney 1964), provides that "an
affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the
seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty." For a pre-code
case setting forth a similar rule, see Maggiros v. Edson Bros., 164 N.Y.S. 377 (Sup. Ct.
1917). See generally 51 N.Y. JUR. Sales § 164 (1966).
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common law that it is possible for a representation to be both
reasonable and false at the same time is less than logically com-
pelling. The emphasis which the ordinance places on accuracy
and truth in the marketplace is long overdue.
The ordinance labels eight specific practices "deceptive," but
asserts that these are not intended to exclude other acts from the
prohibited category of deceptive trade practices. 4' This spec-
ificity, coupled with the open-endedness of the provision should
provide an effective weapon against unscrupulous merchants. In
short, this provision of the ordinance, if fully enforced, replaces
the doctrine of caveat emptor with what might be termed caveat
venditor.
2. Unconscionable Trade Practices-An "unconscionable"
practice is defined as any act which unfairly takes advantage of
the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of a con-
sumer; or results in a gross disparity, to the consumer's detriment,
between the value received by a consumer and the price paid.42
The ordinance provides, however, that no practice shall be
deemed unconscionable unless declared so, and described with
reasonable particularity in a local law or in a rule or regulation
issued by the city's Commissioner of Consumer Affairs. 43 Thus
the ordinance, in and of itself, does not prohibit any uncon-
scionable trade practices. A provision, similar to the one proscrib-
ing deceptive trade practices, prohibiting certain specified uncon-
scionable practices in addition to those set forth in a separate law,
ruling or regulation would have strengthened the ordinance con-
siderably. 44
Guidelines for the issuance of rules and regulations are set
forth as follows:
In promulgating such rules and regulations the commissioner
shall consider among other factors: (1) knowledge by mer-
chants engaging in the act or practice of the inability of
consumers to receive properly anticipated benefits from the
goods or services involved; (2) gross disparity between the
price of goods or services and their value measured by the
price at which similar goods or services are readily obtained
by other consumers; (3) the fact that the acts or practices
may enable merchants to take advantage of the inability of
41 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d-2.0(a).
42 Id. § 2203d7- 2.0(b).
43 Id.
44 The need for such a provision is supported by the fact that only one of the twelve
regulations issued by the commissioner as of February 27, 1971, defines a specific trade
practice as unconscionable and thus prohibited by the ordinance. This regulation, regard-
ing creditor's pre-judgment communications to employers of alleged debtors, appeared in
its final form in the New York City Record of October 13, 1970, and became effective
November 12, 1970.
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consumers reasonably to protect their interests by reason of
physical or mental infirmities, illiteracy or inability to under-
stand the language of the agreement, ignorance or lack of
education, or similar factors; (4) the degree to which terms of
the transaction require consumers to waive legal rights; (5)
the degree to which terms of the transaction require con-
sumers to jeopardize money or property beyond the money or
property immediately at issue in the transaction; and (6) defi-
nitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations, rulings
and decisions of legislative or judicial bodies in this state or
elsewhere. 45
These guidelines suggest that the ordinance is intended to
create a quite broad definition of "unconscionable." However,
some phrases (e.g., "unfair advantage") used to define "uncon-
scionable" tend to inject a subjective element which, to a certain
extent, is necessarily vague and may be difficult to apply on other
than an ad hoc basis. The only use of the term "unconscionable"
in the statutes of the State of New York is in section 2- 302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which authorizes a court to refuse
enforcement of a sales contract, or a portion thereof, found to be
''unconscionable." The official Comment to this provision of the
Code states that "[t]he principle is one of prevention of oppres-
sion and unfair surprise and not disturbance of allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power." 46 It then sets forth several
"illustrative" cases which do little to clarify the distinction. 47
Although the New York courts have, in the past, echoed the
language of the Comment, 48 their applications of the uncon-
scionability doctrine are indicative of a more expansive in-
terpretation of the term than that suggested in the Comment. 49
45 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d- 2.0(b).
46 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. Comment I (McKinney 1964).47 See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code- The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 485, 501-08, 516- 28 (1967), for a general discussion of the failure of the official
Comment cases to add any definitional clarity to the unconscionability provision of the
UCC.
40 See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynesco, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 28, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759
(Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd (as to damages), 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct.
1966); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 191, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct.
1969).49 See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynesco, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966), rev'd (as to damages), 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1966), holding
unconscionable that portion of a contract providing for unreasonable profit (cash sales
price of $900 plus a service charge of $245 for an appliance with an admitted cost of $358)
when the contract had been negotiated in Spanish, but the contract actually signed was in
English and had not been read or explained to the purchasers; Jones v. Star Credit Corp.,
59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969), holding that to sell for $900 ($1,439
including credit charges and sales tax) a freezer unit having an actual value of $300 was
unconscionable as a matter of law; Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marano, 60 Misc. 2d 138,
302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. City Ct. 1969), holding a contract unconscionable wherein an
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Particularly noteworthy in this regard are two recent New York
decisions holding a contract unconscionable, and emphasizing the
lack of equity between the bargaining parties50 -a consid-
eration which the Comment expressly states is beyond the scope
of the unconscionability provision of the Code. Thus there can be
little doubt that the intended usage of "unconscionable" in the
New York City ordinance is not limited to the restricted in-
terpretation of the term enunciated in the Comment to section
2-302 and should be liberally construed along the lines currently
espoused by the New York courts.
It is possible that merchants will challenge as unconstitutionally
vague this section of the ordinance prohibiting unconscionable
trade practices. The due process clause of the New York Con-
stitution 1 as well as that of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution has been interpreted to require that a
legislative enactment be precise if it is to be valid.5 2 New York
courts have recognized this requirement as especially important
in its application to a penal provision, for the citizen must cer-
tainly be given the opportunity to apprise himself of the acts
prohibited. 53 It has been said that this principle is nothing more
than a manifestation of "our ordinary sense of fair play." 54
If a constitutional challenge does arise the question before the
court will necessarily be one of degree. Although the Consumer
Protection Act defines "unconscionable" in rather vague and sub-
jective terms, 55 any due process challenge will have to contend
not only with the provision of the ordinance which renders uncon-
scionable only those practices set forth in a separate law, rule or
regulation, but also with the relatively clear specificity of the
guidelines for the issuance of such rules and regulations.
Even if a court were to consider just the basic definition of
"unconscionable," focusing upon such phrases as "unfair advan-
automobile buyer, with little knowledge of the English language, unknowingly waived
warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose in the purchase of a
defective automobile.50Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (Sup. Ct.
1969); Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 142, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394,
(N.Y. City Ct. 1969).
51 N.Y. CONST. art 1, § 6.
52 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of New York, 385 U.S.
589 (1967), wherein the Supreme Court found a New York statute to be uncon-
stitutionally vague and indefinite under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. A
New York Court of Appeals decision invalidating a statute on the ground that it was vague
and indefinite under the New York Constitution is Trio Distributor Corp. v. City of
Albany, 2 N.Y.2d 690, 143 N.E.2d 329, 163 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1957).5 3 People v. Campobello, 21 Misc. 2d 1015, 1018, 193 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 (Co. Ct.
1959); People v. Vetri, 309 N.Y. 401, 406, 131 N.E.2d 568, 571 (1955).
54 People v. Zanchelli, 8 Misc. 2d 1069, 1070, 169 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (Co. Ct. 1957).
5 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d- 2.0(b).
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tage" and "gross disparity," it would be surprising if the provision
were to be held invalid. By setting forth even these arguably
vague definitional standards, the drafters of the New York ordi-
nance have given the term "unconscionable" more statutory defi-
nition than the provision in the UCC.56 Indeed, the uncon-
scionability section of the UCC and the official Comments thereto
have been criticized for the scarcity of definitional guidance.
5 7
3. Persons Excluded-The ordinance specifically excludes
from its coverage the acts of publishers and broadcasters except
in so far as they are guilty in the sale or offering for sale of their
own services. 58 Advertising agencies are also excluded provided
they are acting on the basis of information given to them by their
clients. 59 It should be noted that the acts of these parties are
excluded even when the copy which they broadcast, publish or
prepare for public dissemination is arguably deceptive on its face.
This apparently represents a policy decision on the part of the city
to avoid the compounding of disputes and to concentrate entirely
on the party who initiates the trade practice. Of greater signifi-
cance is the fact that publishers and broadcasters are relieved of
the necessity to determine the truth or falsity of the advertise-
ments they print or broadcast.
C. Regulations
The ordinance specifically authorizes the issuance of rules and
regulations "as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of
this title, including regulations defining specific deceptive or un-
conscionable trade practices."6 0 This provision is of particular
importance in that it provides a means for the adaptation of the
law to continually changing business methods by allowing the
commissioner to proscribe new unfair trade practices as mer-
chants devise them. In addition, merchants are continually made
aware of those particular practices which have been declared to
be prohibited by the law.
A question immediately arises as to the validity of the delega-
tion of power to the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs to define
specific unfair trade practices prohibited by the ordinance. The
power of a local legislative body to adopt legislation originates in
the state constitution,6 1 and the New York courts have tradi-
56 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (McKinney 1964).
57 See, e.g., Leff, supra note 47, 485-559.
58 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d-6.0.
59 Id.
6o id. § 2203d-3.0.
61 The Constitution of the State of New York provides that every local government shall
have a legislative body and shall have the power to enact local legislation. N.Y. CONsT.
art. IX, §§ 1(a), 2(b)(1).
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tionally held that such power may not be delegated to adminis-
trative agencies or officers. 62 In determining the validity of the
delegation of rule-making power to administrative officials, the
courts have generally looked to the nature of the power con-
ferred 63 and to the standards and limitations6 4 established to guide
the official in the exercise of his discretion.
Although the ordinance confers extensive powers on the com-
missioner and allows him a wide range of discretion, it appears to
be within constitutional boundaries. The underlying prohibitive
provision65 which sets forth the general definition of deceptive
and unconscionable trade practices is arguably complete, leaving
nothing to the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs which is
strictly within the legislative function. That provision includes
examples of practices deemed to be deceptive 66 as well as a listing
of guidelines 67 to be considered by the commissioner in determin-
ing those trade practices which are unconscionable under the
ordinance. Following the delegation of the rule-making power, a
provision is set forth which states that a rule or regulation promul-
gated under the ordinance
may supplement but shall not be inconsistent with...
decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal
62 See, e.g., Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of New York, 298 N.Y. 184, 81
N.E.2d 80 (1948), wherein a state statute prohibiting the establishment of certain private
schools unless registered under regulations promulgated by the state Board of Regents was
held to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In Little v. Young, 274 App.
Div. 1005, 85 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1948), affd, 299 N.Y. 699, 87 N.E.2d 74 (1948), the court
invalidated a town zoning ordinance forbidding construction of a place for amusement in
the town's business district unless especially permitted by a board of appeals. The court
ruled that the ordinance constituted a delegation to an administrative body of legislative
power vested in the town board without prescribing any standard by which action of that
administrative body would be governed.
6See, e.g., Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 305, 196 N.E. 61, 65-66 (1935), where
the court of appeals held unconstitutional a state statute punishing violations of codes
promulgated by the President of the United States under the National Industrial Recovery
Act, and recognized that while a legislative body may not confer upon an administrative
agency or officer the power to make a law, it is well established that the legislature may
delegate the discretionary power to execute and administer the laws. The opinion suggests
that in the fin alanalysis the question is one of degree.
For a similar analysis of the distinction between a delegation of the power to make law
and the power to administer and execute the law, see Tropp v. Knickerbocker Village, 205
Misc. 200, 211, 122 N.Y.S.2d 350, 361 (1953) affd, 284 App. Div. 935, 135 N.Y.S.2d
618 (1954).
6See, e.g., Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of New York, 298 N.Y. 184, 189,
81 N.E.2d 80, 82 (1948), where the court discusses the standards and limitations which
must be placed on a delegation of rule-making power by a legislative body. The court
suggests that the subject matter of rules and regulations, as well as the activities to be
governed thereby, must be set forth in at least general terms, and that there must be a
clearly delimited field of action with rules and principles to serve as guidance for action
therein.
6 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d-2.0(a), (b).6 6 Id. § 2203d-2.0 (a)(l)-(9).
67 Id. § 2203d- 2.0 (b)(I)-(6).
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courts in interpreting the provisions of Section 5(a)(1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1), or the
decisions of the courts interpreting General Business Law
§ 350 and the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302.68
This final limitation on the commissioner's rule-making power
provides some insight into the extent of his authority, but it is not
altogether clear whether it will prove to be a very significant
restriction. The nature of this limitation is particularly evident in
the requirement that no rule or regulation be issued which is
inconsistent with the decisions of the courts interpreting section
2-302, the unconscionability provision, of the UCC. It would
appear that every New York court case where an assertion of
unconscionability has failed would diminish the authority of the
commissioner. Nevertheless, it would not be unreasonable to
conclude that any rule or regulation issued-unless prohibiting as
unconscionable a fact situation identical to one which the New
York courts have held not to be so-supplements, and is not
inconsistent with the decisions of the New York courts. Thus,
assuming some differences in fact situations, the stipulation as to
the nature of rules and regulations which may be issued should
not unduly limit the capacity of the commissioner to declare
certain trade practices to be unconscionable and within the pro-
hibitory provisions of the ordinance. This is especially so in view
of the expansive interpretation given the unconscionability section
of the UCC by the New York courts. 69
In any event, the underlying definitions, the specific guidelines,
and the rather broad general requirement of consistency with
relevant federal and state law would seem to establish sufficient
standards to guide the commissioner in the exercise of his dis-
cretion and to provide adequate limitations upon his power.70
Discussing the general problem of legislative delegation, the
New York Court of Appeals, in an early case, 71 set forth the
following dictum:
In this day when the demands upon the state Legislatures for
necessary and important laws are increasing every year we
must not be rigid in our construction of legislative power.
More and more must the laws be general in form, leaving to
commissions, boards, or other administrative bodies the es-
68 Id. § 2203d- 3.0.
69See note 49 and text accompanying note 50 supra.
70 The constitutionality of the ordinance is supported by People v. Malmud, 4 App. Div.
2d 86, 164 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1957), which upheld a state statute delegating to the Triborough
Bridge and Tunnel Authority the power to enact traffic regulations, the violation of which
would constitute a misdemeanor.
71 Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935).
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tablishment of rules and regulations and the determination of
the facts to which the general law will apply. To make the
violation of any such adopted rule or regulation a crime is not
a delegation of legislative power. 72
Today the non-delegation doctrine has little practical force at
the federal level of government 73 and public policy considerations
such as those set forth in the above quote suggest that the force of
the doctrine should be similarly limited at the state and local level.
D. Enforcement
1. Formal Procedures-The ordinance sets forth both formal
and informal means by which its prohibitory provisions may be
enforced. Formal enforcement is achieved through court action
instituted by the city against parties believed to have violated the
ordinance. 74 If a court determines that a violation has in fact
occurred, the city may recover a civil penalty not to exceed
$350. 7 5 In the case of a knowing violation, the city may recover a
civil penalty not to exceed $500, a fine (i.e., a criminal penalty)
not to exceed $500, or both.76
Upon a finding by the commissioner of "repeated, multiple, or
persistent" violations, the ordinance empowers the city to in-
itiate a mass restitution action to compel the payment into court
of all monies unlawfully received as a result of such violations. 77
Amounts recovered are to be made available to the injured con-
72 Id. at 316, 196 N.E. at 66.
73 In only two cases have congressional delegations to public authorities been held
invalid. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). For extended discussion of these cases, see I
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.06 (1958). Davis submits that the present
status of the law is in accord with the following 1940 statement of the Supreme Court:
"Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion
of legislative power does not become a futility." Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381, 388 (1940).7 4 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d-4.0. Implicit in this section is that all
legal action to enforce the ordinance will be instituted by the city, i.e., the city legal
department. Not only are remedies established but the means to coordinate the seeking of
such remedies is vested in the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs. Since the enactment of
the ordinance, the commissioner has employed a "consumer advocate" whose respon-
sibility it is to work directly with the city legal department in instituting court actions as
provided for in the ordinance. Hiring of the consumer advocate, attorney Philip Schrag,
was reported in the N.Y. Times, May 18, 1970, at 47, col. 3. In a Jan. 7, 1971, telephone
conversation with Mr. Schrag, he indicated that one of the primary responsibilities of his
position is to work in conjunction with the Director of the Penalties Division of the City
Legal Department to insure prompt and appropriate legal action as authorized by the
Consumer Protection Law of 1969.
75 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d-4.0(a).
76 Id. § 2203d-4.0(b). A civil penalty is a monetary penalty, authorized by statute, levied
in a civil action based on a violation of a statute; whereas a criminal penalty is a fine,
authorized by statute, levied in a criminal action for violation of a statute. For a discussion
of the relative merits of each, see Rice, supra note 4, 583-85.
77 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d-4.0(c).
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sumers for a period of one year at the end of which time any
undistributed amounts become the property of the city -for use in
further consumer law enforcement activity. 78 If an injured con-
sumer elects to share in the proceeds of a mass restitution action,
he forfeits his right to institute his own private action against the
violator-i.e., the opportunity to obtain double recovery is fore-
closed.79
Although the monetary penalties provided for in the ordinance
would appear to be insignificant when levied against large mer-
chants, the city-by attempting to establish a compensatory pub-
lic remedy in the form of mass restitution actions-has evidenced
an intent to foreclose any opportunity which might exist for a
merchant to pay the specified penalty but in effect derive a profit
from repeated, multiple, or persistent violations. In view of the
narrow interpretation which the New York courts have given the
state's procedural rule authorizing class actions, 80 and thus the
inability of consumers to seek compensatory relief through the
class action device, the mass restitution remedy represents a
major step in the direction of providing a means of monetary
recovery for consumers who have been injured by unfair trade
practices. There is a major question, however, as to the power
and standing of the city to institute such action.
The powers of a local government, other than those established
in the state constitution, originate in statutory law. There is no
state constitutional provision 8 l nor is there an express statutory
provision 82 authorizing a local government to institute legal action
to seek compensatory relief for city inhabitants injured by civil
wrongs. Arguably, however, such authorization may be inferred
from the fact that local governments do have the power to enact
and enforce ordinances and may exercise all other powers neces-




1See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text. For discussion of the status of the
class action in New York, see Casey, Public and Private Consumer Remedies in New
York, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 326, 337 (1970),
81 The constitutional rights and powers of local governments are set forth in N.Y.
CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-3.
82 The legislative grant of specific powers to cities is set forth in N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW
§ 20 (McKinney 1968).
83 In N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(22) (McKinney 1968), the state legislature authorizes
cities to enact and enforce ordinances. The authorization to exercise other necessary and
proper powers is set forth in N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(23) (McKinney 1968).
For a discussion of the various legal theories which may be used to infer the existence
of statutory power at the state level to institute mass restitution actions, see Wade &
Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded Consumers: Making the Remedy Effective
Through Suit by Government Agency, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031, 1062-65 (1969).
Such reasoning would seem applicable at the local government level as well.
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A more fundamental question arises as to the power of the
state to institute actions of this nature, for it would seem apparent
that the state cannot constitutionally authorize a local government
to exercise a power which the state itself does not possess. 8 4 The
New York Court of Appeals recognized in an early decision that
a suit instituted by the state must involve a distinct public interest
and that the state has no general power to sue to redress any civil
wrong suffered by one or more citizens at the hand of another.8 5
In early 1970, the New York legislature purported to empower
the state Attorney General to institute mass restitution actions on
behalf of aggrieved consumers. 86 Implicit in this enactment was
the legislative determination that a distinct public interest is in-
volved in the maintenance of such representative actions. Al-
though the wisdom of a determination of this nature is subject to
dispute,8 7 there is authority which suggests that it is conclusive
and that it is not within the scope of the judicial power of a court
to rule otherwise.8 8 However, even if this determination is open to
judicial review, it is supported by federal court decisions which
manifest a broad view of "public interest" and are indicative of an
increased willingness on the part of the courts to give govern-
mental entities standing to institute legal actions on behalf of
private citizens.8 9 Particularly noteworthy is United States v.
8 4 Town of Ramapo v. Village of Spring Valley, 40 Misc. 2d 589, 592, 243 N.Y.S.2d
569, 572 (Sup. Ct. 1963), appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y.2d 918, 193 N.E.2d 892, 244
N.Y.S.2d 67 (1963).
85 People v. Albany & S. R.R., 57 N.Y. 161, 167 (1874).
86 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 60(12)(McKinney Supp. 1970).
87 It might be argued, for example, that by instituting a mass restitution action, the state
is simply representing the interests of private plaintiffs (consumers) in a civil action and
that by doing so it ignores the interests of the defendant (a merchant) who is also a citizen
of the state and whose interests must be considered in determining the "public interest."
88 In reference to determinations of the public interest, the United States Supreme Court
has stated that "[slubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases
the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by
social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of Colum-
bia ... or the States legislating concerning local affairs." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
32 (1954).
8The starting point in this regard is In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), wherein the
Supreme Court recognized the standing of the United States to obtain an injunction against
continuation of a strike and boycott affecting twenty-two railroads (presumably capable of
mounting their own lawsuits). The Court held that the strike activities were a burden on
interstate commerce and thus of sufficient public interest to support government legal
action. More recently, the Court has followed similar reasoning in United Steelworkers v.
United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959), giving the United States standing to enjoin an in-
dustry-wide steel strike; and in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), upholding the
constitutionality of a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 1971,
authorizing the Attorney General to bring suit in the federal courts to enjoin interference
on racial grounds with the voting right of citizens. But see Consolidated Edison Co. v.
DiNapoli, 39 U.S.L.W. 2239 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), holding that New York City's status as
vindicator of utility consumers' interest it too tangential and remote to warrant intervention
in an electric company's completely litigated price fixing suit against construction firms.
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Brand Jewelers, Inc.,90 wherein a federal district court sustained
the standing of the United States, in the absence of any legislative
authorization, to bring an action on behalf of injured consumers
against a retail jewelry company with respect to its practice of
obtaining default judgments without proper service of process.
The court determined that such a business practice was a burden
on interstate commerce and thus a matter of public interest.91
Viewing local unfair trade practices as a burden on intrastate
commerce, analogous reasoning could be used to sustain the
standing of a state to institute legal action on behalf of injured
consumers. These considerations arguably provide a basis for the
proposition that the State of New York does in fact have the
power to institute mass restitution actions.
It would appear, then, that if the provision of the New York
City ordinance authorizing mass restitution actions is challenged
in the courts, the city will have to establish not only that the state
has empowered it to maintain these actions, but also that the state
itself has the power to do so, i.e., that such actions are in the
public interest. Neither of these poirts is easily established.
As a final means of enforcement, the city is authorized to make
application to the state supreme court (New York trial courts) for
an order enjoining any trade practice which falls within the scope
of the ordinance's prohibitory provisions. 92 In order to establish a
cause of action under the above enforcement provisions, the ordi-
nance specifically provides that the city need not show that con-
sumers are being or were actually injured by the alleged viola-
tion. 93 Although, as a practical matter, it would seem unlikely that
legal action would be taken without an individual having com-
plained of some injury, this provision is a rather broad grant of
power which might possibly subject a merchant to the enforce-
ment machinery of the act without having done anything which
An analogy may be drawn between government intervention and government-instituted
suits because both involve the nature and extent of the government's interest (see FED. R.
Civ. P. 24(a) ), however, there are several factors which may serve to distinguish the two
types of government action. For example, as suggested in the Consolidated Edison
opinion, practical obstacles-e.g., additional parties take additional time-exist in an
intervention situation which are not involved in government-instituted suits.
90318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In his opinion, Judge Frankel traces the evolu-
tion of precedents for governmental standing to institute legal action on behalf of private
individuals.
91 In the alternative, the court determined that such a business practice constituted
deprivation of property through state action without due process of law, and thus a matter
of public interest. This reasoning would not seem to support the standing of New York
City to institute mass restitution actions, for it is doubtful whether deceptive trade
practices, in general, may be viewed as state action.
92 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d-4.0(d).
93 Id. § 2203d-4.0(e).
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would prompt a consumer to complain. On the other hand, this
provision would enable the commissioner to proceed against a
merchant who would attempt to avoid the enforcement provi-
sions of the act by compensating a single consumer who, know-
ing of the unfair trade practices of the merchant, threatens to
make a formal complaint.
2. Informal Procedures-As an alternative to instituting or
continuing court action as a means of enforcing the ordinance, the
commissioner may employ a more informal method of enforce-
ment by accepting from violators written "assurances of dis-
continuance" of illegal trade practices, which may or may not
provide for voluntary payment of investigative costs and restitu-
tion to consumers.9 4 If such an assurance provides for monetary
restitution, an injured consumer who elects to share in the pro-
ceeds, as in the case of a mass restitution action, must forego any
private action he may otherwise have brought against the mer-
chant. A breach of any such assurance constitutes a violation of
the ordinance and subjects the violator to the more formal en-
forcement procedures, discussed above. 95
This voluntary assurance procedure may serve as a useful
means to obtain compensatory relief for injured consumers. How-
ever, its effectiveness will be severely limited if the courts hold
that the city has no standing to institute formal restitution pro-
ceedings. Moral suasion, without the threat of legal action to seek
restitution, would undoubtedly prove an ineffective method of
securing voluntary monetary settlements.
In considering the enforcement procedures established by the
Consumer Protection Law, it is important to note that the city has
vested the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs with broad in-
vestigative powers. He is authorized to hold public and private
hearings, administer oaths, take testimony, serve subpoenas, and
receive evidence.9 6 These powers would appear to be essential to
meaningful enforcement of any consumer protection legislation.
3. Private Remedies-No provision is made in the New York
City ordinance for private remedies. This could serve to under-
mine the effectiveness of the law as a means of providing injured
94 1d. § 2203d-5.0(a).
95 Id. § 2203d-5.0(b).9 6 The position of Commissioner of Consumer Affairs was created by the city in 1968 at
the time of the establishment of the Department of Consumer Affairs (NEW YORK, N.Y.,
AD. CODE, ch. 64, §§ 2201-2203.), and the commissioner has been vested with these
powers since that time (Id. § 2203(e) ). The provision setting forth the powers of the
commissioner was amended upon enactment of the Consumer Protection Law of 1969 in
order to vest the commissioner with the power to receive and administer monies received
by the city as a result of actions brought for violations of the ordinance. Id.
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consumers with compensatory relief if the commissioner chooses
not to pursue the mass restitution remedy to the fullest extent, or
if that remedy is found to be unconstitutional. Moreover, in view
of the fact that the ordinance makes the mass restitution remedy
available only in cases of "repeated, multiple, or persistent viola-
tions," 9 7 the consumer who is injured as a result of a lesser
violation has no basis for compensatory relief under the ordi-
nance. Ideally what is needed is a provision allowing individuals
injured by unfair trade practices to recover attorney's fees and to
obtain multiple damages in private actions based on violations of
the ordinance.
Although the city is in no position to override the state proce-
dural rules which have been interpreted to severely limit the
availability of compensatory relief through consumer class ac-
tions, 98 it probably could, pursuant to its power to impose "pen-
alties" and "forfeitures" as punishment for violation of ordi-
nances, 100 enchance the traditional private damage or restitution
remedy which may be pursued by an individual consumer. A
measure of this type would be closely analogous to the treble
damage remedy of the Clayton Act, 100 which authorizes the
award of punitive damages in private anti-trust actions regardless
of intent. It has been suggested that to avoid placing an undue
penalty on all violators, any authorization for multiple damages
would best be limited to knowing violations. 10 1 On the other hand,
since the possibility of recovering multiple damages would serve
to increase the number of private restitution and damage actions,
and correspondingly reduce the burden of litigation placed upon
the commissioner, it can be argued that recovery of multiple
damages as well as attorney's fees should be made available in all
private actions based on violations of the ordinance. This would
not only increase the likelihood of vigorous enforcement of the
ordinance, but would also minimize dependence on the commis-
sioner to take action.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the exception of its failure to provide any inducement for
the utilization of existing private consumer remedies, the New
97 Consumer Protection Law of 1969, § 2203d-3.0(c).
98 Determination of procedural rules for the state's courts is vested solely in the state
government. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 101 (McKinney 1963). This section provides, in part, as
follows: "The civil practice law and rules [state law] shall govern the procedure in judicial
proceedings in all courts of the state and before all judges, except where the procedure is
regulated by inconsistent statute."
99 N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(22) (McKinney 1968).
100 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
'01 Rice, supra note 4, at 575.
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York City Consumer Protection Law of 1969 establishes a broad
basis for the protection of the interests of the city's consumers.
Although subject to constitutional challenge, 10 2 the ordinance es-
tablishes a comprehensive ban against a wide range of deceptive
and unconscionable trade practices, something which traditionally
has been a rarity in consumer legislation. Moreover, it creates
both formal and informal public remedies, and establishes a means
for centralized administration and enforcement. It should most
certainly serve as a model for municipal consumer legislation.
In short, the ordinance is a legislative manifestation of the fact
that
[w]e have reached the point where "Let the buyer beware" is
a poor business philosophy for a social order allegedly based
upon a man's respect for his fellow man. Let the seller be-
ware, too! A free enterprise system not founded upon person-
al morality will ultimately lose its freedom. 'o
- Thomas G. Morgan
102 The constitutionality of the ordinance and a regulation issued thereunder prohibiting
creditor's pre-judgment communications to employers of delinquent debtors was upheld in
Commercial Lawyers Conference v. Grant (N.Y. County Sup. Ct., Special Term, Part 1,
Jan. 27, 1971, reported in 165 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1971 at 2, col. 4.) Grounds for the
challenge were (1) conflict with state and federal law, (2) deprivation of free speech, and
(3) denial of due process rights with respect to the alleged power of the commissioner to
levy penalties without court action. The court held all three contentions to be unfounded,
pointing out that the third was based on nothing more than a misinterpretation of the
commissioner's power under the ordinance.
103 Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
In this action, the New York Supreme Court granted a decree sought by the Attorney
General, enjoining promoters of a referral-type sales program from further engaging in
alleged fraudulent and illegal practice.
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